JEL Code G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and RegulationĪbstract Central banks have been discussing the introduction of a retail central bank digital currency (rCBDC) for some time. Currently, however, both the least cost test and the creditor hierarchy limit the possibility of supporting asset and liability transfers and may therefore need to be reformed in order for economically efficient results to be achieved. We also argue that, apart from the availability of the option in law, the least cost test and the creditor hierarchy determine the de facto availability and potential magnitude of alternative measures. It would also allow access to finance to be better preserved and enhance the level playing field for banks and depositors in the EU. It would improve the protection of deposits, thereby safeguarding depositor confidence and overall financial stability. It would speed up the handling of smaller banks’ failures while reducing upfront outlays and final costs for deposit guarantee schemes. Based on our findings, we argue that giving deposit guarantee schemes in the EU the option of using alternative measures would improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the EU banking crisis management framework. The number of Member States where alternative measures have been actively used is even more limited.
However, only 11 EU Member States have so far included such “alternative measures” in their DGSs’ toolkits. JEL Code E50 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→General E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their PoliciesĪbstract In this paper we show that allowing deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs) the option of supporting asset and liability transfers in the event of a bank’s insolvency provides important economic benefits.
The split of topics suggests that the Q&A does not only provide clarification of what has been said in the introductory statement, but also allows journalists to enquire about the discussion within the Governing Council as well as the ECB’s stance on broader economic issues. Focusing on the press conferences of the ECB, this paper employs structural topic modelling (STM) and finds that topics within the introductory statement and the Q&A are significantly different, with a nearly equal split of topics unique to both parts. While research on central bank communication and specifically the European Central Bank’s press conference has shown that it has the potential to move markets, in-depth textual analysis of key communication tools creates room for further analysis. Abstract The aim of central bank communication is to provide information on monetary policy and the economic outlook in a timely manner to the public.
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